As social animals, humans need to live in groups. This contact with conspecifics is essential for their evolution and survival. Among the recommendations to reduce transmission of the new coronavirus responsible for COVID-19 are social distancing and home confinement. These measures may negatively affect the social life and, consequently, the emotional state and eating behavior of individuals. We assessed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the anxiety, premenstrual symptoms, and eating behavior of young women. Data collection was conducted in (...) person and online. A total of 71 participants, average age of 21.26 years, took part in the study. Trait anxiety during the pandemic was significantly lower than in the prepandemic period. Investigation of the “anxiety/stress” symptom of the Premenstrual Symptoms Screening Tool revealed that this symptom was more severe before the pandemic. There was a decline in the desire for sweet and fatty foods during the pandemic. However, craving for traditional foods rose significantly in the same period. Uncontrolled and emotional eating were significantly lower during the pandemic. The results suggest that the pandemic may have had a positive impact on anxiety and eating behavior of the participants, which may be due to differences between urban and rural populations and the latter living with their families. These findings are important for raising a discussion regarding the effects of the current environment on the regulation of cognitive and dietary adaptations. (shrink)

This study aims to investigate assortative mating based on mate value from male perspective. Male participants (132 Brazilian and 106 American) evaluated hypothetical “stimulus” males described in terms of physical attractiveness, social skills, and social status (each varied in high or low levels). Participants rated each stimulus and each stimulus' preferred mating partner on nine traits. The results showed that (1) positive assortative mating was expected in romantic relationships; (2) the stimulus ratings did not vary independently, suggesting that mate value (...) is the result of the interaction of the characteristics of individuals; and (3) that participants expected physically attractive and healthier female partners to pair with high-status male stimuli. The American and Brazilian mating expectations were similar, minor differences indicate that Brazilian participants considered men with high levels of social skills to be more ambitious and intelligent; American participants expected men of high status to be healthier; Brazilians expect men of high status to have more attractive faces, while Americans expected these men to possess more attractive bodies; and Brazilian participants assigned more attractive bodies to men of lower status. These differences reflect the influence of economic and cultural factors on the local environment. The study contributes to the understanding of the construction of market value and reveals that male expectations are in line with human mating preferences. The investigation of mating expectations can be a rich approach to investigate socio-cultural aspects that are related to mating in different cultures. (shrink)

There is not one but many ways to picture the world--Australian "x-ray" pictures, cubish collages, Amerindian split-style figures, and pictures in two-point perspective each draw attention to different features of what they represent. Understanding Pictures argues that this diversity is the central fact with which a theory of figurative pictures must reckon. Lopes advances the theory that identifying pictures' subjects is akin to recognizing objects whose appearances have changed over time. He develops a schema for categorizing the different ways (...) pictures represent--the different kinds of meaning they have--and argues that that depiction's epistemic value lies in its representational diversity. He also offers a novel account of the phenomenology of pictorial experience, comparing pictures to visual prostheses like mirrors and binoculars. (shrink)

Empirical data from studies with both heterosexual and homosexual individuals have consistently indicated different tendencies in mating behavior. However, transgenders’ data are often overlooked. This exploratory study compared levels of sociosexuality and self-esteem between transgenders and non-transgender (cisgender) individuals. The aim was to verify whether either sexual genotype or gender self-perception had more influence on the examined variables in transgenders. Correlations between self-esteem and sociosexuality levels were also investigated. The sample consisted of 120 Brazilian individuals (51 transgenders) from both sexes. (...) Sociosexuality scores indicated mostly sex-typical patterns for transgenders of both sexes across the construct’s three dimensions (behavior, attitude, and desire), except for female-to-male transgenders’ behavioral sociosexuality. Unique associations between the dimensions of sociosexuality were found for transgender participants. No differences in self-esteem were observed and no correlations between self-esteem and sociosexuality were found. The results suggest that transgenders’ sociosexuality is largely influenced by their sexual genotype despite their incongruent gender self-perception and that the relationships between behavior, attitude, and sociosexual desire are different from those observed in cisgenders. (shrink)

Empirical research on aesthetic response poses two challenges to philosophy. The more familiar challenge is that scientific explanations of aesthetic responses debunk what we take to be our reasons for those responses. One reaction to this challenge is an accommodation strategy that seeks to reconcile the scientific findings with an improved understanding of our normative reasons. This paper presents a more fundamental challenge: a well-established body of research in social psychology indicates that we routinely confabulate the reasons we give for (...) our aesthetic response. This challenges the accommodation strategy and suggests that philosophy should adopt a more radical naturalism about aesthetic response. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to identify the kind of Amoralism Nietzsche is arguing for in his writings of the middle period. In the first part of the paper, I focus on the presuppositions as well as on the motivation underlying this version of the amoralist position. Nietzsche diagnoses a normative conflict between intellectual integrity and the metaphysical presuppositions of our moral vocabulary and practices. This diagnosis leads him to the conclusion that we should reform a substantive part of our (...) moral intuitions. However, this first critique of morality, one that we could label an internal critique, is not all that Nietzsche has to say about normativity, even if we consider only the works of the middle period. According to my interpretation, Nietzsche is committed to a position that could be described as normative Minimalism. By developing this position, Nietzsche was clearly influenced by Montaigne´s reception of both Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism. The kind of human life Nietzsche associated with this position is identified by him with the life of the free spirits, conceived as both a genuine heir and an emulator of the ascetic types made possible by the Christian culture, paradigmatically exemplified by Pascal and the French Jansenists. In the second part of this paper, I contrast this kind of normative Minimalism with Nietzsche´s defence of Perfectionism in his later works. I conclude my paper by calling attention to some argumentative advantages of normative Minimalism and to some argumentative difficulties that Perfectionism cannot preclude (from a genuine Nietzschean perspective). (shrink)

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, the theory of (...) Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

One of the key insights of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is the idea that gender-based subordination is not just something done to women, but also something women do to themselves. This raises a question about ethical responsibility: if women are complicit, or actively implicated in their own oppression, are they at fault? Recent Beauvoir scholarship remains divided on this point. Here, I argue that Beauvoir did, in fact, ethically criticize many women for their complicity, as a sign of (...) what she called “bad faith”. I challenge recent accounts by Nancy Bauer and Manon Garcia, who both read Beauvoir as exonerating complicit women. According to this reading, women emerge as human “freedoms” within a social world where a “destiny” of inferiority is already prepared for them. Their self-subordination is then an inevitable product of acting in a patriarchal world. I argue, however, that this interpretation generates a crucial tension, leading Bauer and Garcia to call on women to stop being complicit, while also claiming they cannot avoid complicity. I propose instead a different interpretation, on which feminine complicity is often fueled by criticizable ethical attitudes that are far from inevitable. By revisiting Beauvoir’s notion of “bad faith”, I show that this account is compatible with recognizing the limitations imposed on women’s agency and I show that this feminist ethical criticism is itself an important part of a collective project of social transformation. (shrink)

A detailed discussion of Corbanezi's book, entitled "Perspectivismo e Relativismo na Filosofia de Nietzsc he," published in 2021 by the Collection Sendas & Veredas [Ensaios] in a partnership between the Unifesp Publisher and GEN (Grup de Estudos Nietzsche). The book aims to answer a very specific question: to what extent does Nietzsche's perspectivism incur in relativism? To answer this main question, Corbanezi mobilizes some of the main concepts of Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy, competently displaying their internal articulations (world conception, will to (...) power, forces, perspective, interpretation, relation, impulses, values). In making this choice, he goes against a certain current preference for exploring more peripheral themes of the German philosopher's work. The main and extended argument of the book consists in showing, against the hegemonic reading in the secondary literature, that the question does not bear a univocal negative answer, and this means: if on the one hand, Nietzsche's perspectivism refuses and combats relativism, on the other hand, he actually admits it and even radicalizes it. How is it possible to defend such a conclusion? To some extent, we can say that Corbanezi arrives at this seemingly counterintuitive result by mobilising the resources of Nietzschean philosophy itself, that is, by perspectivising the question. The present discussion reconstructs the author's main arguments in defence of his nuanced position and assesses to what extent such arguments are convincing and supported by defensible methodological choices. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance for the (...) Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a historical overview of aesthetics and the philosophy of art before turning to a discussion of how the philosophy of art bears upon human culture. It then considers the methods used in attacking problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of art by highlighting the distinctions between pure and applied philosophy, between internal and external perspectives on aesthetic and artistic phenomena, and between first-order and second-order methods. It also examines how aesthetics and the philosophy of art are (...) affected as the arts evolve and as empirical studies of aesthetic and artistic phenomena become well established in the social and behavioural sciences as well as the humanities. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the premise that the Utopian language created for the narrative is more than something that only gives the impression of foreignness to the invented nation of Utopia, a mere representation of an outside culture. It is rather a semiotic system devised by the author specifically with the goal of transmitting a message. As such it is indispensable to a fuller understanding of More’s work, and therefore worthy of proper investigation. Consequently, the paper analyses the occurrences of the (...) invented language throughout the author’s text and out of it, in Peter Giles’s writings, word by word, tracing the probable etymologies and meanings, comparing cognate or correlated words in other languages, while conciliating the use of the glossopoeia with the presumptions of semiotics. Some theorists and commentators contribute considerably to the present discussion: Culler (1981. The pursuit of signs. London: Routledge, Romm), James (1991. More’s strategy of naming in the Utopia. Sixteenth Century Journal 22(2). 173–183), Sacks (1999. Introduction to Thomas More’s Utopia. In Utopia. Boston: Bedford/St Martin’s), as well as More’s and Peter Giles’s own elicitations. The result of such reflections is a theory on the critique of the names and the artificial words coined by Thomas More. (shrink)

O gás sarin no metrô de Tóquio, as 'balas perdidas' no Rio de Janeiro e os ataques terroristas às torres gêmeas em Nova York ou ao transporte coletivo em Madri e Londres revelam que nossa sociedade interdependente é muito vulnerável.

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

The article intends to show that MacIntyre’s notion of friendship (which, according to him, would be a reappropriation of Aristotle’s notion of philia), while ignoring the political aspect explicitly emphasized by Aristotle, reduces the notion of friendship to its social or civic aspect, thereby weakening the political nature of man.

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)

The present thesis intends the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s dialogue with the history of scepticism through the identification of his main sources. Such dialogue is constantly mediated by texts from authors contemporary to Nietzsche, therefore the reconstruction of the sources could not remain exclusively inside the sceptical tradition, but included frequently some post-Kantian authors. The fundamental claims of the present thesis are: Nietzsche was deeply acquainted with the history of scepticism; his work assumes this tradition in a very innovative manner; Nietzsche (...) not only associated himself instrumentally to scepticism, but tried to incorporate some of the essential commitments of the sceptical life to his understanding of philosophical life. (shrink)

Gender seems to be everywhere in the norms governing our social world: from how to be a good friend and how to walk, to children’s clothes. It is not surprising then that a difficulty in identifying someone’s gender is often a source of discomfort and even anxiety. Numerous theorists, including Judith Butler and Charlotte Witt, have noted that gender is unlike other important social differences, such as professional occupation or religious affiliation. It has a special centrality, ubiquity and importance in (...) social practices. This observation moves us away from the classic philosophical question ‘what is gender?’ towards a more underappreciated one: ‘what is the role of gender’? To answer this question, I introduce the notion of social standing, which refers to our ability to enter into social relations. Social standing distinctions are an important feature of human societies. However, our existing philosophical tools do not adequately capture this notion: it is neither a moral distinction, nor is it reducible to hierarchy. I offer a conception of our entry into social relations as always conditioned by various shared representational assumptions about social subjects. When individuals are anomalous with respect to those assumptions, their social standing is in doubt. This explains important forms of uncommon and peculiar treatment across societies. I argue that forms of social devaluation on the basis of severe and visible disability in our society are central examples of diminished social standing. In our social context, being hard to recognize through the matrix of gender makes one representationally anomalous and imperils one’s social standing. Gender plays a fundamental role because gender legibility is a precondition for full social standing. Gender norms parallel ‘ability norms’ in this respect, linking notions of normalcy in scholarship on gender and in scholarship on disability. Social standing also explains two key phenomena about gender. Firstly, it tells us why our social practices and norms are pervasively gendered. Given the performative and relational nature of gendered positions, this is necessary for constant gender legibility. Secondly, social standing recognition accounts for social anxiety phenomena around gender ambiguity. These phenomena are reactions to anomaly as a threat to our social systems of meaning. In the final part of my dissertation, I consider some political consequences of my view. Understanding this special role of gender allows us to identify a distinct type of backlash to feminist social change that is particularly insidious. It is not driven by the hierarchical investments of the most gender-privileged, but rather by our collective investment in gender as a system of social coordination. I explore 2000s ‘raunch feminism’ to argue for this hypothesis. Gender’s role as a conditioning parameter of social standing puts systematic pressure on all would-be social subjects to be gender legible. This requires that individuals position themselves in recognizably gendered ways within social practices. But when gender differentiation is eroded, this positioning becomes tricky. This gives rise to a disorientation I call ‘meaning vertigo’. Meaning vertigo prompts attempts at reinstating a clear gendered system. In the process, gender equality suffers a serious set-back. To make substantial feminist progress, we must unseat gender from its central position in social domains like sexuality. I suggest that the best way to do this may be by foregrounding other aspects of social identity as systems of social coordination, instead of working on gender directly. (shrink)

Nota do tradutor: O texto apresentado a seguir é uma tradução do ensaio “Heidegger and theology”. Para uma indicação de outras versões posteriores do texto e comentários a seu respeito, ver nota de rodapé 2, do autor, abaixo. No texto da tradução, a paginação original é indicada entre [ ] e em negrito.Nota preliminar do autor [235]: Este ensaio foi apresentado, de forma um pouco mais abreviada, para uma conferência de teólogos concernente ao tema sobre “o Pensamento e o Discurso (...) Não-objetivante na Teologia Contemporânea”1. Para os conferentes esse título tinha um significado atual e concreto: o uso do pensamento tardio de Martin Heidegger pelaa teologia protestante. Tendo em vista as circunstâncias de sua concepção e pronunciamento, e o eco que ele então provocou naquela ocasião e posteriormente2, achei melhor [236] deixar o ensaio com seu caráter original enquanto um discurso que se dirige a um público. (shrink)

The representation of color by pictures raises worthwhile questions for philosophers and psychologists. Moreover, philosophers and psychologists interested in answering these questions will benefit by paying attention to each other's work. Failure to recognize the potential for interdisciplinary cooperation can be attributed to tacit acceptance of the resemblance theory of pictorial color. I argue that this theory is inadequate, so philosophers of art have work to do devising an alternative. At the same time, if the resemblance theory is false, then (...) color depiction has interesting implications for color science. Empirical researchers must rethink the widespread assumption that color recognition requires color constancy. I suggest that a neuropsychological account of color recognition will be instrumental to completing the philosophical task, but by the same token scientists might do well not to proceed without casting an eye to the work of philosophers of art. (shrink)

Feminists have always been concerned with how the clothes women wear can reinforce and reproduce gender hierarchy. However, they have strongly disagreed about what to do in response: some have suggested that the key to feminist liberation is to stop caring about how one dresses; others have replied that the solution is to give women increased choices. In this paper, we argue that neither of these dominant approaches is satisfactory and that, ultimately, they have led to an impasse that pervades (...) the contemporary feminist debate. The problem is that both sides of the debate understand women’s complicity in patriarchal subordination as a matter of what women wear and do. Instead, we propose a phenomenological analysis that understands complicity as based in our relations to our clothes. Starting from this phenomenological perspective, we sketch a new relational feminist ethics of dressing. This alternative ethical paradigm cannot yield a simple recipe for how to dress or tell us what garments are off-limits. But it can offer a way to make critical feminist judgements about clothes without veering into a stifling new prescriptivism. (shrink)

_Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts_ is the first comprehensive collection of papers by philosophers examining the nature of imagination and its role in understanding and making art. Imagination is a central concept in aesthetics with close ties to issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, yet it has not received the kind of sustained, critical attention it deserves. This collection of seventeen brand new essays critically examines just how and in what form the notion of imagination (...) illuminates fundamental problems in the philosophy of art. (shrink)

This article is the lead piece in a special report that presents the results of a bioethical investigation into chimeric research, which involves the insertion of human cells into nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal embryos, including into their brains. Rapid scientific developments in this field may advance knowledge and could lead to new therapies for humans. They also reveal the conceptual, ethical, and procedural limitations of existing ethics guidance for human‐nonhuman chimeric research. Led by bioethics researchers working closely with an (...) interdisciplinary work group, the investigation focused on generating conceptual clarity and identifying improvements to governance approaches, with the goal of helping scholars, funders, scientists, institutional leaders, and oversight bodies (embryonic stem cell research oversight [ESCRO] committees and institutional animal care and use committees [IACUCs]) deliver principled and trustworthy oversight of this area of science. The article, which focuses on human‐nonhuman animal chimeric research that is stem cell based, identifies key ethical issues in and offers ten recommendations regarding the ethics and oversight of this research. Turning from bioethics’ previous focus on human‐centered questions about the ethics of “humanization” and this research's potential impact on concepts like human dignity, this article emphasizes the importance of nonhuman animal welfare concerns in chimeric research and argues for less‐siloed governance and oversight and more‐comprehensive public communication. (shrink)

Jewish Law as Rebellion is unconventional and controversial in its approach to the world of Jewish Law and its response to religious crises. The book delves into the contemporary application and development of halacha and pointedly protests many accepted methods and ideals, offering new solutions to existing halachic dilemmas. Rabbi Cardozo discusses hot topics such as same-sex marriage, conversion, and religion in the State of Israel and presents a critical analysis and explanation of the application of halacha.

Antes de tecer qualquer tipo de homenagem ou traçar elogios, é necessário alertar ao leitor do risco e, talvez, da insuficiência das palavras. O alerta se deve ao fato das palavras não exprimirem com precisão o olhar que acolhe, a voz que direciona sem cercear a liberdade de escolher por si só qual caminho seguir. É assim que brevemente podemos aproximar o conceito de “cuidado” ao professor Dr. Luizir Oliveira, ou simplesmente Luizir.

A empatia, em Edith Stein, é uma vivência que permite o conhecimento do outro, mastambém do “sujeito empatizante”. Pela teoria “do vivenciar completo”, alcança-se nãoapenas um conhecimento da vivência do outro, mas também dos valores subjacentesà sua ação. Através desta teoria, pretende-se responder à proposta levinasiana deuma responsabilidade total, por um lado, e, por outro, de P. Ricoeur, que apresenta anecessidade de uma relação que pense ao mesmo tempo a reflexividade do si mesmo.A empatia permite um modo de constituição personalizadora (...) para os dois sujeitosque mantém, de modo simultâneo, a unicidade e a alteridade de cada um. (shrink)

Vector spaces over fields are pseudofinite, and this remains true for vector spaces over division rings that are finite-dimensional over their center. We also construct a division ring such that the nontrivial vector spaces over it are not pseudofinite, using Richard Thompson's group F. The idea behind the construction comes from a first-order axiomatization of the class of division rings all whose nontrivial vector spaces are pseudofinite.

RESUMO A empatia, em Edith Stein, é uma vivência que permite o conhecimento do outro, mas também do "sujeito empatizante". Pela teoria "do vivenciar completo", alcança-se não apenas um conhecimento da vivência do outro, mas também dos valores subjacentes à sua ação. Através desta teoria, pretende-se responder à proposta levinasiana de uma responsabilidade total, por um lado, e, por outro, de P. Ricœur, que apresenta a necessidade de uma relação que pense ao mesmo tempo a reflexividade do si mesmo. A (...) empatia permite um modo de constituição personalizadora para os dois sujeitos que mantém, de modo simultâneo, a unicidade e a alteridade de cada um. ABSTRACT According to Edith Stein, empathy is an experience that allows for knowledge of the other and of the "empathizing subject". The notion of "full experience" makes it possible to know the experience of the other, as well as the values underlying his/her actions. On the basis of this theory, the article seeks to respond to Levinas' proposal of total responsibility, on the one hand and to P. Ricœur, who argues in favor of a relation that, at the same time, takes into account the reflexivity of the self, on the other. Empathy allows for a personalized mode of constitution of the two subjects, which, simultaneously preserves the singularity and alterity of each. (shrink)